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
TASK TEAM VII - ANALYST COMMUNICATION

Interim Report of Task Team VII
(Analyst-to-Analyst Communication)

1. As a result of its own deliberations and informal discussions with analysts of varying levels in State, CIA (DD/I) and DIA, the Task Team has reached certain interim conclusions concerning the problem of communication between analysts. These are based primarily on our partial investigation of the Latin American area, but we suspect that they are applicable in large part to other areas of the world as well.

a. There are, in fact, a surprisingly large number of mechanisms by which analysts from differing agencies collaborate and communicate. Among these mechanisms are: the USIB committees and subcommittees; the NIE mechanism; the coordination of the CIB; various task teams set up from time to time; informal analyst discussion groups, e.g., Guatemala; and the operation of normal, established liaison arrangements. Through these various mechanisms, analysts identify their opposite numbers in other agencies, exchange information and opinions, and achieve working level cooperation. Nonetheless, there is variation in the application of these arrangements with respect to both geographic and functional coverage. For crisis coverage, analyst communication normally is good; in quiet areas, exchanges are minimal.

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b. The time factor has a very real bearing on the question of analyst communication. This factor also is closely related to the problem of secure communications that is discussed in paragraph e. Thus we find that consultation on current intelligence is very spotty--timeliness takes precedence over coordination. On the other hand, *with some exceptions, more extensive consultation takes place on longer-range intelligence, some exceptions is generally better coordinated.*

c. The problem of identifying the appropriate analysts in another agency is directly related to the organizational structure of that agency or office. State, which has a straightforward geographic organization, presents little problem in comparison with CIA and DIA, which are organized on a mixed geographic and functional basis. The exchange of current organization charts would be helpful to each agency as a means of identifying the intelligence capabilities of other members of the community. Charts, however, should not be considered a tool for identifying analysts. (See paragraph (d) below). In order to avoid misuse and to overcome problems of security, organization charts *of other agencies* should be held only in the top offices of *each* agency and in established liaison circles.

d. The problem of identification has two facets. One is the identification of the responsible analyst at the appropriate level in the chain of command; the other is identification of the most knowledgeable or expert person on a particular subject, wherever he may be within an organization. The first kind of identification can usually be done, if necessary, through

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established liaison channels, albeit these channels are sometimes slow and cumbersome. The second kind of identification, however, is extremely difficult and depends on the variables of individual knowledge or acquaintance. Even within agencies themselves, no organized method for this kind of identification exists, except within DIA which has now established a roster of its personnel showing the area or subject specialties and background of each individual. Rosters, however, should be considered to be intra-agency tools, *useful, for example,* ~~primarily~~ for the purpose of adjusting personnel assignments to meet crisis situations. For ~~inter-agency communication~~ *purposes, however,* ~~to be effective, command~~ *of command channels* requirements must be maintained. Thus it is the responsible analyst who is the key in this type of communications cycle and not the analyst who might be identified as more knowledgeable. *(a complete)* For these reasons the idea of ~~an~~ interagency directory of analysts skills and expertise seems of dubious value--even if the many obstacles ~~of~~ *to* its preparation and maintenance could be overcome. Our present thinking on this problem of identification tends in the direction of improved liaison arrangements and the ~~development of~~ *and maintenance of additional and* ~~more clearly established points of approved contact.~~

e. The problem of secure communications between agencies deserves increased attention. *We propose to examine the distribution* ~~It is suggested that the distribution~~ and use of the "gray" line might be examined, with a *to determine if, and how, it can be made a more useful for* ~~view to making it more accessible to analysts.~~ *analyst communication* Arrangements ~~now under way for secure facsimile transmission between the~~

By so doing, the needs of command channels and compartmentation can be SECRET *me. b.* *security*

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NMCC and Operations Centers in State and CIA may alleviate this problem to some extent. In this general field particularly we feel we shall, as we proceed, need the assistance and expertise of a representative from the NSA.

Variations in
f. Individual security clearances as a *hindrance to* ~~means of promoting~~ security in analyst-to-analyst communication does not appear to present a problem in Latin America. This may, however, not be true elsewhere where more exotic types of collection efforts are employed.

Normal departmental and agency internal constraints on sole use of intelligence
g. A factor inhibiting analyst-to-analyst communication is that of ~~competition~~. *(The desire to be "first on the street")*

new & had back has
with an intelligence item appears on occasion to have overridden

the ~~normal desirability of achieving coordination with another~~

These constraints
~~interested agency.~~ The cumulative affect of ~~this competition~~

Some times
is to erect an invisible but very real barrier to communication

and coordination among analysts in different agencies. *Never Harker, we believe!*

That these constraints are normally a necessary adjunct to command and policy responsibility, and that no action to eliminate this inhibitory factor is warranted.
barrier, of course, is by no means universal, but where it exists, it is a factor of considerable account.

2. It has often been assumed that existing arrangements for analyst-to-analyst communication and collaboration were seriously deficient. For the purpose of confirming this assumption, and pin-pointing more precisely the specific areas of deficiency, the Task Team has developed a questionnaire which it is discussing with selected analysts in State, DIA and CIA concerned with Latin America. DIA has completed these discussions and State and CIA expect to do so shortly. The Task Team will then be in a position to direct its attention to specific areas for improvement, if such should emerge.

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~~There is one further inhibiting factor in analyst to analyst communication which we feel a natural and realistic deterrent that must be accepted. This is the factor of internal constraint which are part and parcel of each Department and Agency command and policy responsibilities. Delay in release of such internally oriented intelligence does deter communication.~~

C. Improvements should be made in the present facilities by which analysts ^(in one agency) ~~are able to~~ communicate ^{with} ~~orally~~, orally or by facsimile or similar methods, with their opposites in other agencies, in order to accelerate their capability so to do, either orally or by facsimile or similar methods.

And back has new language

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3. Based upon its limited survey to date of the problem, the Task Team believes the following recommendations are pertinent *(to Latin American, and the* and should be implemented by the agencies concerned: *time plans to develop them in regard to other areas:*

intelligence a. Each agency should develop a directory of its available skills and expertise for its own internal use, especially for strengthening staffs in crisis situations.

b. Interagency liaison arrangements *and additional points of contact* should be reviewed and strengthened. These arrangements should include a comprehensive exchange of organization charts of the production components of the agencies.

d The establishment of analyst-to-analyst relationships should be included as part of the ongoing crisis contingency planning between State, Defense, and CIA.

*INSERT
NEW "E"*

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